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X. TAX
A. Unincorporated Foreign Organizations Taxed as
Partnerships
The tax character of an unincorporated organization is determined
by a test prescribed by treasury regulations.' Only if the entity is deter-
mined to be a controlled corporation, is its income taxed.' Using this
test, in MCA, Inc. v. United States,3 the court of appeals held that unin-
corporated foreign organizations, jointly owned by a controlled foreign
corporation and an employee trust, were partnerships for domestic tax
purposes.4
In 1970, MCA entered into an agreement with Paramount Pictures
Corporation to form a joint organization for the distribution of films
abroad. Pursuant to the agreement, they formed a Dutch corporation,
Cinema International Corporation (CIC), and each received forty-nine
percent of the corporation stock.5 The remaining two percent of the
CIC stock was used to fund an entity called "Stichting", an employee
trust created by MCA and Paramount for the benefit of CIC's top di-
rectors.6 CIC had a fourteen member Board of Directors, seven mem-
bers from MCA and seven from Paramount.7 Stichting had a three
member Board of Directors.8 Two of the members, the controlling in-
terests in Stichting, were also the controlling interests in CIC.9
CIC and Stichting jointly established local distribution outlets,
"distributorships".' ° Each distributorship is owned ninety-five percent
by CIC and five percent by Stichting, and is structured as an independ-
ent taxable entity under the applicable foreign laws. I In addition, to
obtain favorable United States treatment, the organizational docu-
1. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 413.
2. All income earned by a controlled corporation, "subpart F" income, is taxed the
year it is earned. I.R.C. § 951(a)(1) (West 1983). Subpart F income includes foreign base
income. I.R.C. § 952(a)(2) (West 1983). This, in turn, includes all rents and royalties re-
ceived from related persons. I.R.C. § 954(a)(1), (c)(3)(A) (West 1983).
3. 685 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1982).
4. Id at 1104. The parties had stipulated that the test applied to both foreign and
domestic entities.
5. Id at 1100.
6. Id
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1101.
9. Id at 1103.
10. Id at I100.
11. Id.
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ments of each distributorship include provisions to conform to partner-
ship requirements.' 2
However, the commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service deter-
mined that the organizations were corporations and assessed a defi-
ciency of $868,170.00 against MCA, an indirect owner of the
organizations.' 3 MCA paid the deficiency and sued for a refund, con-
tending that the organizations were partnerships.'
4
The court used a four-part test to determine whether the distribu-
torships were corporations or partnerships. 15 To be classified as a cor-
poration under that test, an organization must possess at least three of
four enumerated corporate characteristics: limited liability, centralized
management, free transferability of interests and continuity of life.
16
The presence or absence of the corporate characteristics is determined
both under the entity's organizational documents and the local laws
under which the entity is organized.'
7
The parties stipulated that the distributorships exhibit the corpo-
rate characteristic of limited liability and that they lack the corporate
characteristic of centralized management.' 8 The court focused on the
government's contentions that the distributorships had continual life
and freely transferable interests."
The government contended that CIC and Stichting represented a
single economic interest, despite the provisions in their agreement to
form the distributorships, (restriction of transferability and provisions
for dissolutions under certain situations) because they could never act
independently of one another.2" CIC controlled Stichting, according to
the government.
The court determined that CIC and Stichting were owned by par-
ties with separate economic interests despite the fact they were both
controlled by the same individuals.2' The government had contended
that in the event of conflicting interests, Stichtings' Board of Trustees
would act in derogation of their fiduciary duty, sacrificing the interests
12. Treas. Reg. § 301.701-2, T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 413; 685 F.2d at 1100.
13. 685 F.2d at 1100.
14. Id
15. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 413; 685 F.2d at 1101.
16. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1)-(3), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 413, 414; Larson v. Com-
missioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq. in, 1979-1 C.B. 1; 685 F.2d at 1101.
17. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2)-(e)(1), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 413, 414-17; 685 F.2d
at 1101.
18. 685 F.2d at 1102.
19. Id.
20. Id
21. Id at 1103.
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of the trust beneficiaries for those interests of Paramount and MCA.2 2
However, the court rejected this contention, stating that the individuals
as trustees, were obligated to exercise their powers in accordance with
fiduciary principles.23 Their actions were subject to judicial review.
2 4
Absent evidence that Stichting's trustees had violated their fiduciary
duty, the distributorships had to be classified as partnerships for tax
purposes.25
The government's last argument was that Congress enacted Sub-
part F to eliminate the tax deferral advantage of doing business
through foreign controlled corporations.26 Therefore, the court should
have focused on the nature of the income, not the form of the entity
generating it.27 The government contended that the four-part test
should be disregarded, as Congress wanted to tax the type of income
generated by CIC.28
The court rejected this argument based on the wording of the stat-
ute.2 9 Although the court agreed that CIC's income was the type that
Congress intended to tax, it was generated from a controlled partner-
ship, not a controlled corporation, and thus not taxable under the stat-
ute.3' The court advised the government to appeal to the legislature to
close the loophole, as it was not the court's business to do so.
3
1
This case will have minimal impact on the entertainment industry
22. Id.
23. Even though the trustees were given broad investment discretion which might effec-
tively preclude judicial review of the trustees' investment judgment, it did not relieve the
trustees of their fiduciary loyalty to the trust beneficiaries. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 543
(2d ed. 1978). Under California law, which applied to the present case, a grant of absolute
discretion did not authorize a trustee to neglect its trust or abdicate its judgment. Coberly v.
Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 685, 689, 42 Cal. Rptr. 64, 67 (1965); See, Cal. Civ. Code
§ 2269(c) (West Supp. 1982); 685 F.2d at 1103.
24. California courts will review a trustee's actions to determine whether they are unrea-
sonable, arbitrary, capricious or in bad faith. Lix v. Edwards, 82 Cal. App. 3d 573, 578, 147
Cal. Rptr. 294, 298 (1978); 685 F.2d at 1103.
25. The court rejected a similar in the area of family partnerships. In Bateman v.
United States, 490 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1973), the partners in a limited partnership, had trans-
ferred their interests to themselves as trustees for their children. The court held that the
trustees were not the true owners of the trusts. The determination of whether a trustee has
become the real owner is made by an examination of his actions. Kuney v. United States,
524 F.2d 795, 796 (9th Cir. 1975). In Bateman and in the present case, the trustees' actions
did not resemble the actions a true owner would have taken. 685 F.2d at 1104.
26. 685 F.2d at 1104.
27. Id at 1104-05.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1105.
30. Id
31. United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, 349 U.S. 232, 236 (1955); 685 F.2d at
1105.
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as the court is not developing any new law. It is merely applying an
established test to determine whether Stichting was a controlled part-
nership or controlled corporation. 32 The major problem with the case
is the court's determination that Stichting and CIC were separate enti-
ties.33 The court recognized that the two entities would probably act in
concert, but decided that Stichting would not do so if it was detrimental
to their interests. 34 It would be hard to imagine the individuals control-
ling both entities to ever arrive at the situation where one entity would
have to act contrary to the other. These individuals would prevent
that. Stichting and CIC were, effectively, one entity.
The court did not address the issue of whether the distributorships
would be reclassified as controlled corporations if Stichting's trustees
broke their fiduciary duty to act as one entity with CIC. Nor did the
court reach the issue regarding whether the provisions of the agreement
would still apply if the entities were found to have an identity of inter-
ests. The court left these issues to a future court, refusing to go beyond
these facts. Another example of the court's restraint was their rejection
of the government's policy argument. The court instead relied only on
the exact wording of the statute. This court's decision was mechanistic
and conservative.
Grisel Feldfeber
B. Nonprofit Corporation Granted Tax Exempt Status Despite
Partnership With Profit Corporation
The Internal Revenue Code provides for an exemption from taxa-
tion for certain specified organizations.' Among the exempt organiza-
tions specified is a corporation that is organized exclusively for
charitable or educational purposes.2
In Plumstead Theatre Society, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue,3 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court's ruling4 and Plumstead Theatre Society, Inc. was organized and
operated exclusively for charitable and educational purposes, notwith-
32. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 413.
33. 685 F.2d at 1103.
34. Id
1. § 501, I.R.C. 1954.
2. § 501(c)(3), I.R.C. 1954.
3. 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982).
4. 74 U.S.T.C. 1324 [CCH Dec. 37,257].
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1984]
standing the fact that it had entered into a limited partnership with a
for-profit corporation and two individual investors.
Plumstead Theatre Society, Inc., (Plumstead), was incorporated as
a nonprofit corporation under California law. Plumstead filed an ap-
plication with the Internal Revenue Service for recognition of its tax
exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.5
The Internal Revenue Service issued an adverse final ruling denying
Plumstead exempt status. The Tax Court disagreed with the Internal
Revenue Service and held that Plumstead had shown that it was organ-
ized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes; therefore, its tax
exempt status should be recognized. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the
Tax Court and affirmed its ruling.
Plumstead's articles of incorporation stated that it was formed as a
nonprofit corporation and listed several specific and primary purposes
which are best summarized as the promotion of the performing arts,
particularly the theatre. The articles of incorporation further provided
that Plumstead was not and shall not be operated for pecuniary gain
and that no part of its net earnings would inure to the benefit of any
private member or individual.
Plumstead's initial plans included presenting professional dra-
matic theatre productions, forming a workshop in the Los Angeles area
for new American playwrights, and establishing a fund to assist new
and established playwrights in writing new plays for Plumstead to pro-
duce. In furtherance of these plans, Plumstead engaged in extensive
negotiations and entered into an agreement with Ambassador Interna-
tional Cultural Foundation, a nonprofit cultural foundation, for joint
sponsorship of a season of three plays. In addition, Plumstead entered
into an agreement with the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing
Arts, a nonprofit tax-exempt organization, to co-produce the play
"First Monday in October" in Washington, D.C.
Under the agreement with the Kennedy Center, Plumstead and
the Center were each to provide one-half of the capitalization required
for production and were to share equally in any profits or losses. Plum-
stead encountered difficulties in raising its one-half of the capital. In
order to raise the necessary capital, Plumstead organized a limited part-
nership and sold a portion of its rights in the play to the limited part-
ners. Plumstead was the general partner and the limited partners were
two individuals and one for-profit corporation.
The Washington, D.C. production of "First Monday in October"
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-I(a)(3).
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was Plumstead's only theatrical production prior to the issuance of the
final adverse letter ruling by the Internal Revenue Service. Upon com-
pletion of the Washington, D.C. run of "First Monday in October", the
production costs exceeded the proceeds by more than $90,000.00 and
Plumstead closed the play at a loss.
Internal Revenue Code section 501(a) exempts from federal in-
come tax any organization described in section 501(c). Section
501(c)(3) provides, in pertinent part, that a corporation which is organ-
ized and operated exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is
an organization referred to in section 501(a) (and therefore exempt),
provided that no part of its earnings inure to the benefit of any private
individual shareholder, and that it does not engage in prohibited
activity.
Generally, in order to sustain a claim for exemption under section
501(c)(3), the taxpayer must prove:
(1) that it was organized exclusively for charitable purposes,
(2) that it is operated exclusively for charitable purposes,
(3) that no part of its net earnings inured to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual and (4) that no substantial
part of its activities consist of carrying on propaganda or
otherwise attempting to influence legislation.6
According to the Internal Revenue Regulations, an organization is
regarded as "operated exclusively" for exempt purposes only if it en-
gages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more exempt pur-
poses specified in section 501(c)(3) of the Code.7 In Plumstead, it was
the government's position that Plumstead was not "exclusively oper-
ated" for the exempt purposes set out in its articles of incorporation
because of the limited partnership arrangement.
It is clear that the promotion of the arts can be both charitable and
educational. The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that a foundation
organized and operated for the purposes of promoting interest and ad-
vancing knowledge in the arts and drama qualified for exemption from
federal income tax as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.8 In its ruling, the Internal Reve-
nue Service stated that "cultural organizations devoted to the promo-
tion of the arts, and which otherwise meet the statutory requirements
for exemption from federal income tax under section 501(a) of the
6. Huron Clinic Foundation v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 847 at 850 (D. S.D. 1962)
rev'd on other grounds, 324 F.2d 43 (8h Cir. 1963).
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-i(c)(I) (1959).
8. Rev. Rul. 64-174, 1964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 183.
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Code may qualify for exemption as educational or charitable."9 The
ruling noted that although the organization in question did not operate
a theatre or produce or direct plays, its purposes and activities were
clearly designed for promotion of the arts through the encouragement
of theatre.
In a later ruling, the Internal Revenue Service again found that a
nonprofit corporation organized and operated primarily for the pur-
pose of developing the interest of the American public in the dramatic
arts qualified as a tax exempt organization.' 0 The primary activity of
the organization described in the ruling was that of producing plays,
making the classic works of the theatre available in cities and colleges
throughout the United States by means of a permanent touring theatre
group. The ruling stated that it has long been the position of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service that so-called "cultural" type organizations may
be exempt from federal income tax as educational or charitable. The
ruling continued that the Internal Revenue Service's position is re-
flected in example (4) of the Income Tax Regulations," which provides
that museums, zoos, planetariums, symphony orchestras, and other
similar organizations are educational if they otherwise meet the re-
quirements of section 501(c)(3) of the Code. The ruling concluded by
stating that the theatre company was educational in much the same
manner as a symphony orchestra for purposes of tax exempt status.
Similarly, a 1973 ruling held that a nonprofit organization created
to foster the development in a community of an appreciation for drama
and musical arts through sponsoring professional presentations quali-
fied for tax exemption. 2 The organization's activities were not for pri-
vate benefit even though it procured the theatre productions through a
commercial booking agency that was instrumental in creating the or-
ganization. Several factors were relied upon to find that the organiza-
tion's contract with the theatrical agency did not indicate that the
organization was serving a private interest. These included the fact
that the contracts were negotiated at arms length, were subject to re-
newal annually, and permitted the organization to book shows with
other agencies.
It is clear that Congress contemplated two independent tests in ap-
plying section 501(c)(3), one of creation or oganization and one of op-
9. Id
10. Rev. Rul. 64-175, 1964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 185.
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.50.(c)(3)-l(d)(3)(ii) ex. 4.
12. Rev. Rul. 73-45, 1973-1 C.B. 220.
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eration. 13 However, to a degree, the test of organization cannot be
separated from the test of operation.' 4 This is because the only distinc-
tion between the two tests is the element of time.
The organization test was undoubtedly conceived and enacted to
encourage a full disclosure as to the organization's intended method of
operation and thus serves as a condition precedent to achieving an ex-
empt status.' 5 The operational test would seem to be a condition subse-
quent enacted to insure that the organization would not deviate from
its exempt purposes.' 6
The Internal Revenue Code makes no provision for the manner by
which the purposes of an organization are to be ascertained. The Reg-
ulations provide that the organizational test is met if the articles of in-
corporation limit its purpose to one or more exempt purposes, and do
not expressly empower it to engage in, except insubstantially, activities
which in themselves are not in furtherance of one or more exempt
purposes.17
The main controversy in Plumstead did not revolve around the
specific language used in the articles of incorporation (the organiza-
tional test) but rather than the operation of the organization as it af-
fected its exempt status (the operations test).
It should be noted that the courts have found section 501(c)(3) to
be remedial and have applied the doctrine of liberality in construing
it. 8 The doctrine of liberality resolves construction ambiguities in
favor of the taxpayer and rejects a standard which would impose strict
form over substance. 9 Therefore, it is apparent that the organization
test will be satisfied by a carefully drafted articles of incorporation.
In the Tax Court proceedings, the Commissioner unsuccessfully
asserted two arguments. First, the Commissioner argued that despite
the stated purposes in its articles of incorporation, Plumstead was oper-
ating in a manner indistinguishable from a commercial enterprise in-
volved in the business of producing plays, because its only activity thus
far was co-producing a play that had a commercial hue.2" This argu-
13. Broadway Theatre League of Lynchburg, Va., Inc. v. U.S., 293 F. Supp. 346 (W.D.
Va. 1968).
14. Samuel Friedland Foundation v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D. N.J. 1956).
15. Broadway Theatre League, 293 F. Supp. at 351.
16. Id. at 348.
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1) (1959).
18. Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955); Arthur Jordan Founda-
tion v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 1954).
19. 293 F. Supp. at 353.
20. 74 U.S.T.C. at 1330.
[Vol. 4
ment was apparently based on Internal Revenue Code section 502, an
exception to section 501. Section 502 provides that an organization op-
erated for the primary purpose of carrying on a trade or business for
profit shall not be exempt from taxation under section 501 on the
ground that all of its profits are payable to one or more organizations
exempt from taxation under section 501 .2 This section essentially pre-
cludes a nonprofit organization from operating a business that is unre-
lated to its tax exempt activities.
The Tax Court conceded that the line between commercial enter-
prises which produce and present theatrical performances, and non-
profit tax exempt organizations that do the same is not always easy to
draw.22 Nevertheless, the court was able to articulate several distinc-
tions. The major difference cited by the court was that commercial
theatres are operated to make a profit whereas nonprofit theatrical or-
ganizations are not.23 Other differences which primarily stemmed from
the profit-nonprofit motive distinction were that commercial theatres
choose plays having the greatest mass audience appeal and generally
run the play as long as they can attract a crowd whereas a nonprofit
theatrical organization strives for quality and generally presents a
number of plays during a season for a relatively short specified time
period.24 Furthermore, a commercial theatre sets its ticket prices to pay
the total costs of production and to return a profit whereas a nonprofit
theatrical group tries to keep its ticket prices at a level which is afforda-
ble to most of the community and the box office receipts will rarely
cover the costs of production.25 The court also noted that commercial
theatres will not generally organize other activities to educate the pub-
lic nor will they instruct relatively unknown playwrights and actors
whereas nonprofit theatrical organizations will generally provide edu-
cational programs and opportunities for new talent.26 The Tax Court
found that Plumstead had shown that its organization and operation
were more similar to other nonprofit theatre organizations than to com-
mercial theatres. 27 In reaching this decision the court considered Plum-
stead's planned activities as well as the co-production of the play.28
The Commissioner's second argument was that Plumstead was op-
21. § 502, I.R.C. 1954.
22. 74 U.S.T.C. at 1332.




27. Id. at 1333.
28. Id at 1330-31.
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erated for private rather than public interests because of the partner-
ship entered into with two individuals and a for-profit corporation.
29
The Tax Court found the partnership arrangement, which was limited
to one play produced by Plumstead, to be no more intrusive or indica-
tive of private interests than the contractual percentage arrangement
approved of in Broadway Theatre League of Lynchburg, Va. v. United
States3" (Broadway).
In Broadway, the Broadway Theatre League entered into a con-
tract with United Performing Art, Inc. (United), a booking agent.3'
The contract was for a one year term, with an option for renewal by the
League.32 The major provisions of the contract provided that: the
League shall annually conduct a membership campaign of at least a
week's duration to sell seasonal tickets to theatre series of not less than
four attractions; the price of the seasonal tickets is to be mutually deter-
mined by United and the League; United is to provide campaign and
promotional material for the membership drive; United is to endeavor
to make available at least four high quality theatrical attractions during
the theatrical season and that the League shall deal exclusively with
United for the term of the contract.33 The compensation for United's
services were fifteen percent (15%) of the aggregate membership dues.
34
Because of the contractual relationship with United, the IRS ruled that
the League was providing substantial aid to United in its commercial
operation as a booking agent and therefore was not operated exclu-
sively in furtherance of any of the specific exempt purposes and conse-
quently denied exempt status. 5
The district court in Broadway noted that the IRS does not argue
that the League does not have the right to enter into contracts necessary
in the conduct of exempt activities but rather than the provisions of the
contract with United envision such a control that it may be concluded
that the League was organized and was operated for the benefit of
United.3 6 The court concluded that the government's (IRS) argument
was misdirected in that the terms of the contract neither detract nor
add to the exempt purposes for which the League was created, nor do
29. Id. at 1333.
30. 293 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Va. 1968).




35. Id. at 349.
36. Id. at 353.
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they impose a controlling superstructure over the Leagues operation.37
Furthermore, the court noted that although it is possible that an organi-
zation that has qualified for exemption during its existence deviate
from its purposes so that its exempt status is no longer justified and
may be removed, the mere possibility of this occurrence should not be
enough to deny the organization an exemption if all the other provi-
sions of Section 501(c)(3) are satisfied.38
Some of the factors that the court in Plumstead mentioned and
evidentally utilized in reaching the conclusion that the partnership ar-
rangement was no more intrusive or indicative of private interests than
the contractual percentage arrangement in Broadway were that the sale
of a portion of Plumstead's interest was an arms length transaction;
Plumstead was not obligated to return any of the capital contributed by
the limited partners; the partnership had no interest in Plumstead or in
any other plays it was planning to produce; the limited partners had no
control over Plumstead; and none of the limited partners was an officer
or director of Plumstead.39
The court in Broadway stated that "the prohibition in Section
501(c)(3) against any benefit inuring to private shareholders or individ-
uals clearly and without question refers to the organization contem-
plated in the first sentence of the statute (the exempt organization itself)
and not to any disassociated organizations such as the legal services,
secretaril services, or . ..an organization .. .who has a bona fide
contractual relationship with the exempt organization."4 The court in
Plumstead in essence is recognizing and expanding on this principle by
allowing partnership relationships.
Footnote 8 of the Plumstead Tax Court decision4 indicates that
the Commissioners' contention that the agreement reflects a private
rather than a public purpose is an argument that Plumstead has com-
mercial rather than artistic objectives. The footnote continues by stat-
ing that even assuming that these objections may be so neatly bifurcate
and that "First Monday in October" was a commercial venture, the
play was only one of many to be produced, and plays were only one of
the contemplated means through which Plumstead intended to advance
the arts.4 2 The footnote concludes by saying that at most, any profits
37. Id. at 354.
38. Id.
39. 74 U.S.T.C. at 1334.
40. 293 F. Supp. at 355.
41. 74 U.S.T.C. at 1337.
42. Id
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from the play under this theory might be subject to tax on unrelated
business income, but it would not be inimical to exempt status.43 The
aforementioned footnote reveals the court's belief that the threshhold
requirements for granting exemption are lower than those for deter-
mining taxation.
The issue on appeal for the Ninth Circuit was whether the Tax
Court erred when it found as a fact that Plumstead is not operated
primarily for the benefit of private individuals. In a cursory opinion"4,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's conclusion that Plumstead is
operated exclusively for charitable and educational purposes within the
meaning of Section 501(c)(3). It held that the Tax Court's finding was
not clearly erroneous45 and that the partnership arrangement in ques-
tion was no more indicative of impermissible service of private interests
than that approved in Broadway.
46
The Ninth Circuit decision in essence merely summarized the de-
cision of the Tax Court. Unfortunately it neither added to nor clarified
the Tax Court's decision.
The Tax Court decision fails to provide a clear test to determine
whether an organization will be granted tax exempt status. The deci-
sion would have been of much greater significance and usefulness if it
would have expressly stated the following propositions and guidelines
which appear implicit in the decision.
First, it should be recognized that the threshhold requirements for
tax exempt status are low. This proposition is supported by both tax
and policy considerations. The tax considerations include the fact that
exempt organizations are taxed on unrelated business income. Fur-
thermore, an organization's tax exempt status may be lost if it fails to
operate in a manner consistent with its exempt purposes. Policy con-
siderations include encouraging the establishment of charitable and ed-
ucational (as well as other specified) organizations.
The "two independent tests" discussed in Broadway provide a
framework with which to evaluate both the exempt status and taxabil-
ity of an organization. The threshhold for exempt status is the "organi-
zation test" in Broadway which places primary reliance on the exempt
purposes stated in the articles of incorporation. In other words, an or-
43. Id
44. 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982).
45. Citing Thompson v. C.I.R., 631 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1980); Sibly v. C.I.R., 611
F.2d 1260, 1262 (9th Cir. 1980).
46. 293 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Va. 1968).
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ganization whose articles of incorporation provide for exempt purposes
should be granted exempt status.
The ease of obtaining exempt status under the "organization test"
necessitates a strict review of the actual operations. It is obvious that
the review must be conducted on a case by case basis. The review
could result in three possible alternatives: (1) all income is from ex-
empt purposes and therefore not taxed; (2) some of the income is
earned from non-exempt purposes (i.e., unrelated business income) and
is subject to taxation; or (3) all of the income is from non-exempt pur-
poses or private individuals are being benefitted and the entire income
is subject to taxation and the organization's tax exempt status may be
revoked.
In analyzing the operations of the organization it must be recog-
nized that the consequences from concluding between either the second
or third alternative differ greatly. If the second alternative applies, a
portion of the income, that which is unrelated to the exempt purpose,
will be subject to taxation. If the third alternative applies, besides sub-
jecting the entire income to taxation the tax exempt status will probably
be lost. The loss of the tax exempt status is often much worse for than
the organization than is the taxation. That is because most tax exempt
organizations receive the vast majority of their funding because of their
exempt status. Without the exempt status most exempt organizations
could not survive financially.
As a practical matter, the consequences of either losing exempt
status or of never being granted exempt status or of never being
granted exempt status are enormous. Therefore, the business relation-
ships and activities which an exempt organization is permitted to enter
in must be clear. Perhaps the most important lesson of Plumstead is the
court's implicit recognition that an exempt organization can enter into
any relationship in furtherance of its exempt purpose. Of course the
relationship must be bona fide and at arms length and not a mere sub-
terfuge to benefit individual members of the exempt organization.
Lawrence J Turner
C. Nonresident Alien Personal Service Income
Professional athletes who maintain their foreign citizenship while
playing on American sports teams encounter unique problems when
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) calls to even up the score. Al-
1984] TA X
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though the IRS provides guidelines' for computing the tax liability of
the nonresident alien,2 the personal service contract' player filing under
this status is faced with uncertainty when determining the amount of
his income allocable to United States sources.4 In an effort to clarify
the basis for determining the extent to which the nonresident alien ath-
lete's salary is subject to tax, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Stemkowski v. Commissioner' recently held that the salary earned6
under a player's annual contract compensates the athlete for services
performed during the training camp and play-off periods, as well as
during the regular playing season.7 Additionally, the court ruled on the
allowance of several types of deductions unique to the professional
athlete.8
Professional hockey player Peter Stemkowski, a Canadian citizen,
played for the New York Rangers during the 1970-71 and 1971-72 sea-
sons.9 A member of the National Hockey League (NHL), the team
played its games both in the United States and in Canada, with home
games being played at Madison Square Garden in New York City.' °
Since Stemkowski's home was in Canada, he resided in the New York
area during the playing season when he was not traveling to games
1. I.R.C. §§ 871-878 (1976). All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as
in effect in the tax years in issue, unless otherwise indicated.
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(a) (1957). A nonresident alien is an individual who is neither a
resident nor citizen of the United States.
3. For most professional sport athletes, the primary source of income received is for
services performed pursuant to a personal service contract. See J. Weistart & C. Lowell,
The Law of Sports 843 (1979).
4. Forty-one similarly situated hockey players were issued notices of deficiency in 1974
and 1975. They agreed that two cases consolidated at the Tax Court level, Stemkowski v.
Commissioner (T.C. No. 4239-75) and Hanna v. Commissioner (T.C. No. 3485-76), would
dispose of their cases before the Tax Court. 76 T.C. 252, 253 (1981).
5. 690 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1982) (per Oakes, J.; other panel members joining in the opin-
ion were Lumbard, J. and Pierce, J.).
6. Id at 42. Stemkowski was paid an annual base salary and received bonuses depend-
ing upon his caliber of performance during the regular competition and play-off season. His
salary was not determined on an individual games-played basis.
7. Id See also 76 T.C. 252, 299. The Tax Court previously held that the contract
period for which Stemkowski was compensated the base salary consisted solely of the regu-
lar playing season.
8. 690 F.2d at 46-48. Conclusive prospective effects of Stemkowski are presently uncer-
tain because Hanna, the other hockey case consolidated with Stemkowski before the Tax
Court, is pending appeal in the Fourth Circuit (No. 81-2122).
9. 690 F.2d at 46-48. Since the regular season includes portions of two calendar years,
the court analyzed segments of both seasons in determining whether Stemkowski was defi-
cient on his 1971 United States tax return.
10. Id.
elsewhere. "
As a nonresident alien, 2 Stemkowski's 1971 income was subject to
taxation only on that portion connected with personal services he per-
formed within the United States.' 3 According to the terms of his NHL
Standard Player's Contract,' 4 the fixed compensation for the 1970-71
season was $31,500 and $35,000 during the 1971-72 season, plus vari-
ous bonuses.' 5 Since the NHL player's year is divided into four peri-
ods,'6 Stemkowski claimed that the contract compensated him for three
of the periods, excluding only the off-season period. 
7
In 1975, the Commissioner issued a deficiency notice to Stemkow-
ski for the 1971 taxable year. Stemkowski had calculated his United
States source income based upon the amount of days in the three peri-
ods that he argued constituted the contract period. 18 The Commis-
sioner determined that he had underestimated the proportion of his
income derived from services performed in the United States, as well as
failing to establish his ordinary and necessary business expenses as be-
ing connected with his United States income. 9
In a subsequent petition to the Tax Court, Stemkowski increased
the total number of days for which he claimed he was compensated to
365.20 However, the court held that the contract salary compensated
him for the regular playing season only, a total of 179 days.2' In addi-
tion to disallowing several of the taxpayer's claimed deductions for lack
of substantiation,22 the Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's determi-
nation disallowing several fitness-related deductions for failure to es-
11. Id. at 43.
12. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(a) (1957).
13. I.R.C. §§ 864(b), 87 1(b). See generally Scripp, The Problem of Residence and Federal
Income Taxation on Nonresident Alien Individuals, 43 Notre Dame Law. 535 (1968).
14. 690 F.2d at 42. Stemkowski had earlier signed a 2-year contract with the Detroit
Red Wings, but had been traded to the New York Rangers prior to the beginning of 1971.
15. Id Bonuses included a $1500 award for each round won in the play-offs.
16. Id at 43. The four periods are: (1) Training Camp: beginning in September and
lasting approximately 30 days; (2) Regular Season: beginning in October and lasting until
April of the following year; (3) Play-off Period: immediately following the end of the regu-
lar season and ending in late May; and (4) Off-season: commencing at the end of either the
regular season or play-off period, depending upon the success of the team in league competi-
tion, and lasting until the first day of training camp.
17. Id at 44. The three periods that Stemkowski claimed totaled 234 days: training
camp-27 days; regular season-179 days; play-off period-28 days.
18. Id.
19. Id at 43; 76 T.C. 252, 266-67.
20. Id. at 44; 76 T.C. at 287.
21. Id. at 46; 76 T.C. at 263, 283.
22. Id. at 44; 76 T.C. at 310-311. Cf. I.R.C. § 274(d). Costs of travel, entertainment,
amusement or gifts for business purposes can only be deducted when supported by adequate
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tablish their connection to United States earned income.23 Stemkowski
subsequently filed an appeal in the Second Circuit in 198 1.24
ALLOCATION OF INCOME
Since Stemkowski's contract did not distinguish between payments
for services within or outside the United States,25 the court used the
"time basis" formula suggested by Treasury Regulation section 1.861-
4(b)26 in order to determine the portion of the nonresident alien's in-
come drawn from United States sources. However, the basic compo-
nents constituting the variables in the formula2 7 were in dispute.28 In
reversing the Tax Court's finding that the contract salary covered only
the regular playing season, the Stemkowski court analyzed both the
NHL Standard Player's Contract and the Owner-Player minutes and
Agreements, 29 as well as considering testimony from league officials.3"
The standard contract required the players to report to training camp
in good physical condition and to participate in all exhibition games.
Failure to do so resulted in a fine, deductible from the player's basic
salary.3 Furthermore, players were required to participate in play-off
records of the time, amount, place, business purpose and business relation of the person
entertained.
23. 690 F.2d at 44; 76 T.C. at 302. Cf I.R.C. § 162(a).
24. 690 F.2d at 42 n. 1. Based upon this appeal and the appeal of Hanna in the Fourth
Circuit, (No. 81-2122), the Tax Court suspended decisions in the 41 other hockey cases until
the decisions of both Stemkowski and Hanna became final.
25. Id. at 44.
26. Id Treas. Reg. § 1.861-4(b) (1975) provides that: "[T]he amount to be included in
gross income will be that amount which bears the same relation to the total compensation as
the number of days of performances of the labor or services within the United States bears
to the total number of days of performance of labor or services for which the payment is
made."
27.
Number of days services performed
in U.S. Total
Total number of days for which Compensation
taxpayer is compensated
76 T.C. 252, 284.
28. See id at 263, 287. Stemkowski contended that the basic salary compensated him
for the entire year, resulting in the ratio of 187/365. 690 F.2d at 45. The Tax Court calcu-
lated Stemkowski's tax liability based upon the ratio of 164/179, determining that the con-
tract salary covered only the regular season.
29. Id. at 46. The Owner-Player Council minutes and Agreements provided for addi-
tional payment plus travel expenses and room and board for training camp and pre-season
exhibition games.
30. Id at 45.
31. Id at 46.
games.32 Even though separate bonuses were awarded for play-offs if
the team won, the court found that these were simply incentive bonuses
to influence the players' conduct during the regular season. Since the
contract required specific performances outside the regular playing sea-
son in exchange for the basic contract salary, the court determined that
the annual compensation additionally covered services performed dur-
ing the training camp and play-off periods.33
Notwithstanding this, the court rejected Stemkowski's claim that
the contract covered a full 365-day year. Agreeing with the Tax Court,
the Stemkowski court excluded the off-season period in its calculation
of the taxpayer's income allocable to United States sources. 34 Al-
though Stemkowski argued that he was obligated by the terms of his
contract to appear at training camp "in good physical condition"," the
court found that the contract imposed no specific obligations on the
player during the off-season, declaring that, "Fitness is not a service




Year-round physical fitness is a primary concern for most profes-
sional athletes. Stemkowski claimed his off-season physical condition-
ing expenses as ordinary and necessary37 expenses incurred in carrying
on his business since his contract required that he maintain good physi-
cal fitness throughout the year. 38  In finding the Tax Court's holding
"clearly erroneous" 39 for disallowing the taxpayer's physical condition-
ing expenses deduction, the court reasoned that the off-season condi-
32. Id. A team qualifies for the play-off competition if it ranks high in the league during
the regular playing season. Consequently, the off-season could commence as late as June,
depending upon the success of the team in the play-offs.
33. Id. at 46.
34. Id
35. 76 T.C. at 255. NHL Standard Player's Contract para. 2(a) (1970). 76 T.C. at 294.
According to witnesses before the Tax Court, a player's contract had never been terminated
because of failure to report in "good condition", except for serious injuries, despite the fact
that players reported to camp in various degrees of physical condition.
36. 690 F.2d at 46.
37. I.R.C. § 162(a). Under § 162(a), "[tlhere shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business ... "
38. 690 F.2d at 46; 76 T.C. at 301-02. The Tax Court rejected this contention, reasoning
that the conditioning related only to reporting to the Canadian training camp in good condi-
tion. The expenses were allocable to income earned in Canada and, therefore, not
deductible.
39. 690 F.2d at 46; see generally, Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,
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tioning contributed to the player's good physical condition required
throughout the regular season 4° and therefore, at least in part, was con-
nected to Stemkowski's production of income in the United States.4 ,
Nevertheless, in order to be permissible as a deduction, the expenses
would have to be allocated between Canadian and United States
source income.42
The Siemkowski court did not explicitly accept the taxpayer's
claimed off-season conditioning expenses deduction. Although the
court recognized the possible authenticity of such a claim, it observed
that, "Not everything that is done to develop one's body, even if one is
a professional athlete, is necessarily for business. 4 3 Consequently, this
issue was remanded to determine whether the deduction was ordinary
and necessary for business or merely for personal fun and relaxation.'
Only three types of expenses not related to income from a trade or
business in the United States are allowed as deductions to the nonresi-
dent alien taxpayer: (1) charitable contributions, (2) casualty or theft
losses, and (3) personal exemptions.45 Relying on Internal Revenue
Code section 873(b), the court rejected Stemkowski's disability insur-
ance46 and sales tax47 deductions as being personal and not business
expenses.48 Additionally, many of Stemkowski's miscellaneous ordi-
456 U.S. 844 (1982) (defining "clearly erroneous" standard required to set aside the trial
court's findings).
40. 690 F.2d at 46. NHL Standard Player's Contract para. 2(b) (1970).
41. Id Income effectively connected with a nonresident alien's United States business is
taxable on a net basis at the same graduated rates that apply to U.S. taxpayers. I.R.C.
§§ 871(b), 873(a). Stemkowski's claimed expenses would only be deductible if he could
show the relationship between the amount claimed as a deduction and the production of
taxable United States income. See generally J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 44
(1973).
42. 690 F.2d at 47. This issue was remanded for a factual determination.
43. Id at 46-47. The court suggested a "spectrum" approach for evaluating the deduct-
ibility of physical conditioning activities. Weightlifting and jogging, exemplary of the type
of exercise a hockey player might undertake to strengthen and coordinate the body, might
be considered at the business end of the spectrum and therefore deductible. Activities such
as golf and bowling might be at the fun-and-relaxation end of the spectrum for the hockey
player and therefore nondeductible under I.R.C. § 262.
44. 690 F.2d at 47.
45. I.R.C. § 873(b).
46. 690 F.2d at 48, citing Blaess v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 710 (1957) (disability insur-
ance premiums are not deductible where the reimbursement payments are not specifically
restricted to business overhead expenses incurred during the disabled period); Rev. Rul. 81-
192, 1981-31 I.R.B. 6.
47. 690 F.2d at 48. Stemkowski had specifically deducted the sales tax on wedding band
purchases, an obvious personal, non-business expense.
48. Id
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nary and necessary business expenses49 were disallowed, 50 although on
different grounds from those of the Tax Court.5  The court found that
Stemkowski had either failed to establish deductibility52 or to ade-
quately substantiate the claimed entertainment and gift expenses.53
The costs of purchasing hockey journals and answering fan mail, how-
ever, might be considered ordinary and necessary business expenses,
and therefore, was remanded for a factual determination.54
Concurring with other decisions involving professional athletes,
55
the court rejected Stemkowski's claimed "team city expenses."56 He
had argued that the expenses incurred while residing in New York City
were for business travel away from his Canadian home.57 However,
relying on the third test of Commissioner v. Flowers,58 the court deter-
mined that Stemkowski's choice to live away and travel from Canada
in order to play with the New York-based Rangers was purely per-
sonal, lacking the requisite connection between the expenditure and the
49. I.R.C. § 162(a).
50. 690 F.2d at 47-48. The expenses that were not allowed as ordinary and necessary
business expenses included: the costs of general magazines and newspapers; costs of promo-
tional activities, such as entertaining fans, team members and media; hairstyling; gifts over
$25 to team trainers; and telephone and television maintenance costs.
51. Id. at 47. The Tax Court had disallowed the deductions on the erroneous ground
that, since they were not required by the employer, they were not deductible under I.R.C.
§ 162(a). 76 T.C. at 306-07. See generally 4A Mertens, Law and Federal Income Taxation
§ 25.12 (1979).
52. 690 F.2d at 47; I.R.C. § 162.
53. 690 F.2d at 47; I.R.C. § 274(d); see supra note 22.
54. 690 F.2d at 47-48. These types of deductions need not be substantiated under I.R.C.
§ 274(d).
55. See Wills v. Commissioner, 411 F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1969) (professional baseball
player who maintained Spokane residence while playing for the Los Angeles Dodgers can-
not deduct Los Angeles living expenses); Forrest M. Blue, 44 T.C.M. 927 (1982) (profes-
sional football player must claim as his tax home the city where his team is based, not the
city where minor expenses are incurred and more time is spent during the taxable year).
56. 690 F.2d at 43 n.3, 48-49. On his original tax return, Stemkowski did not claim a
deduction for "team city expenses." However, his initial claim for this expense totalled
$6525.00 on his amended return.
57. Id. at 43, 48. Stemkowski lived in New York City during most of the six month
regular playing season and returned to Canada where he lived during all of the off-season.
58. 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946) (travel expenses not deductible as expenses incurred in
pursuit of business where it was taxpayer's personal preference to maintain his residence in a
city other than that of his principal post of duty).
According to the Flowers test, three conditions must be satisfied in order to deduct
travel expenses under I.R.C. § 162(a):
(1) Expenses must be ordinary and necessary;
(2) Expenses must be incurred while away from home; and
(3) Expenses must be incurred in pursuit of a trade or business.
The Stemkowski court held that the third condition was not satisfied. 690 F.2d at 48.
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pursuit of the taxpayer's business.5 9
The Stemkowski holding regarding allocation of income may re-
sult in reduced tax liability for professional athletes who are nonresi-
dent alien U.S. taxpayers. By defining the duration of the professional
sports contract to include the training camp and play-off periods, the
court's decision enables the athlete earning a portion of income outside
the United States to reduce his tax bill by allocating less of his compen-
sation to United States sources. As a result, an athlete's tax liability
will decrease as the number of days played in foreign locations in-
creases. Stemkowski could favorably be extended to other professional
athletes playing on domestic teams whose season includes games
played outside the United States. However, the holding should be
viewed narrowly as having immediate impact only on nonresident
aliens who determine their United States tax liability based upon the
time-basis formula."
The reasoning of Stemkowski enables a taxpayer to decrease the
amount of income allocable to United States sources only if portions of
the extended period include a majority of days played outside the
country. 61 Consequently, if a player trains or plays most of his play-off
games within the United States, the extended contract period may actu-
ally increase the tax liability of the nonresident alien taxpayer. 62 Since
a larger percentage of the player's income would be allocable to United
States sources, the Second Circuit's holding could subject a larger por-
tion of the nonresident alien's income to taxation.63
59. Id. at 48. See Rev. Rul. 83-82, 1983-22 I.R.B. 5 (providing guidelines for determin-
ing whether a work assignment away from a taxpayer's regular place of employment is tem-
porary, so that the costs of travel, meals, and lodging during the assignment are deductible.)
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-4(b) (1957); see supra notes 26 and 27. Stemkowski may have
ramifications for United States citizens and residents earning income outside the United
States who receive foreign tax credit on that income. Since this casenote deals only with the
nonresident alien's tax consequences, discussion of this issue is beyond its scope.
61. 690 F.2d at 43-46. As a result of the Second Circuit's ruling, Stemkowski was able to
allocate a greater portion of his income to Canadian sources because his team trained in
Canada.
62. The likelihood of an increase in the nonresident alien's tax liability is considered in
Harwood, Recent CA-2 Decision Focuses on Computing U.S. Source Income for Nonresident
Alien, 58 J. TAx'N 266 (1983). However, this will be the result only if the taxpayer does not
claim any increased or different deductions in order to reduce his tax base.
63. Based on a 250 day contract period, the time-basis formula results in the following
percentages:
Percentage of income allocable to U.S. sources if 30-day training camp is in U.S.:
205 -= 82%
250
Percentage of income allocable to U.S. sources if 30-day training camp is not in
U.S.:
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Notwithstanding this, the court's ruling allows a taxpayer to claim
increased deductions as a result of expanding the time period for which
he is compensated.64 The increase in deductions can be manifested in
two ways:
(1) an increase in the value of existing deductions, 65 and
(2) an increase in the total number of deductions for which
the taxpayer is eligible.
Since increased deductions reduce the amount of income subject to tax-
ation,66 Stemkowski should prove to be beneficial to the taxpayer, even
if the majority of days in the extended portion of his contract occurs
within the United States.
Suppose Billy Beater, a nonresident alien hockey player, takes
four taxi cab rides every month, paying ten dollars for each ride. He
legitimately claims a two hundred and forty dollar deduction for taxi
cab fares during the six month regular playing season. According to
Stemkowski, Beater can now claim a deduction for the expense of taxi
cab rides he incurred during the training camp and play-off periods.
As a result of the longer contract period, Beater's existing taxi cab fare
deductions increase in value.67
During the training camp period, Beater entertains members of the
sports media in hopes of receiving favorable press and media coverage
during the regular playing season. He claims this expense as a new and
175 = 70%
250
64. The following mathematical equation illustrates this theory.
TY = % (Y) - D
TY = Taxable Income
Number of days services performed in U.S.
Total number of days for which taxpayer
is compensated.
V" = Gross Income
D = Deductions
As D increases, TY decreases.
65. The following mathematical equation illustrates this theory.
D = (At + Bt + Ct)
D = Deductions
A = Taxi cab fares per month
B = Travel expenses per month
C = Athletic shoes expense per month
t = months in the taxable year that player can deduct expenses.
As t increases, D increases.
66. See generally J. Chommie, Federal Income Taxation § 44 (1973).
67. See supra note 65. An increase in deductions in this situation will result only if the
taxpayer incurs similar expenses during the additional period.
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different deduction that he incurs only during the training camp period.
Relying on the court's holding in Stemkowski, the nonresident alien
professional athlete can decrease his tax liability by claiming increased
deductions for expenses incurred during the additional contract
periods.
Barbara Ferris
D. Assignment of Income
One of the greatest problems facing entertainers and sport figures
is that they receive large salaries for services performed over short time
periods. This results in a disproportionate personal income liability for
several years, after which the income drops dramatically. The solution
to this problem is to devise a method of deferring the income to some
point in time when the player's or performer's income tax liability is
much less.!
In the past, individuals faced with this problem attempted to defer
income and avoid high taxes by assigning income to a child, a spouse,
or some entity partly or wholly owned by the earner.2 In most of these
cases the Internal Revenue Service ("Service") and the courts have
held that the person performing the income-generating service was lia-
ble for the taxes on the income generated. In Johnson v. Commis-
sioner, the tax court held that a basketball player was liable for
income tax on the money he generated as a player despite the player's
contractual arrangement to receive a monthly salary for life from a cor-
poration distinct from his team in return for his services over the dura-
tion of his career.
The player, Charles Johnson, contracted with a Panamanian cor-
poration ("PC") giving PC the right to control Johnson's services in the
area of professional sports for six years in return for PC's payment of
fifteen hundred dollars per month to Johnson for life.4 PC later li-
1. Another solution would be to devise a method of deferring income "earned" during
a 5-10 year period over a 15-25 year period.
2. See, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (husband held liable for income derived
as attorney despite valid contract with his wife making all their earnings, including salaries
to be received, held and owned by both as joint tenants); See also Vnuk v. Commissioner,
621 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1980) (medical doctor who conveyed his lifetime services as an M.D.
to a trust with beneficial interests in himself, his children and his wife was held to be liable
for his entire income as an M.D because he was not a bona fide servant of the trust nor did
the trust exercise any control over the M.D'.'s services).
3. 78 T.C. 882 (1982).
4. PC's payments to Johnson were later raised to two thousand dollars.
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censed its rights and obligations under the Johnson agreement to EST
International, Ltd. ("EST").
Johnson negotiated and entered into an NBA Uniform Player con-
tract with the San Francisco Warriors for the 1974-75 and the 1975-76
seasons. EST was not a party to any of the negotiations and the War-
riors refused to contract with any party but Johnson. However, John-
son assigned his contract to EST and the Warriors made the contract
payments directly to EST.
Johnson contracted with the Warriors for another five seasons fol-
lowing the expiration of the first contract. During the third season
Johnson was placed on waivers and he later signed with the Washing-
ton Bullets. The tax court only concerned itself with those tax years
Johnson played for the Warriors.
During those tax years in question, Johnson declared only his pay-
ments from EST as business income. The Service issued tax refunds to
Johnson based on the W-2s issued by the Warriors that Johnson sub-
mitted with his returns. The refund checks were then specially en-
dorsed by Johnson to EST. The only personal income disclosure
Johnson made was when he filed for an extension on one of his returns.
The Service notified Johnson that he was deficient in his taxes as
his salary from the Warriors was properly income to him.
The tax court, in holding Johnson deficient for those tax years in
question, sustained the well-established rule that income must be taxed
to the "actual" earner.5 The court found that Johnson, not EST, was
the actual earner.6
In determining who the actual earner was, the tax court applied a
two part test derived from case law in this area.7 The first part of the
test is whether the service performer is truly an employee of the corpo-
ration; does the corporation "meaningfully" direct and control the em-
ployee?' The second part of the test is whether there is a contract
between the corporation and the individual or entity using the em-
ployee's services?9
If both questions are answered affirmatively, the court stated that
the actual earner could be said to be the corporation and not the service
performer. 0
5. 78 T.C. at 892. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.A. at 114.
6. 78 T.C. at 894.
7. Id. at 891. See generally supra note 16 at 6.
8. 78 T.C. at 891. See Laughton v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939).
9. 78 T.C. at 891.
10. Id. See also Fox v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938) (cartoonist incorporated
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The court, for the sake of argument, accepted that EST exercised
control over Johnson for the purposes of the first part of the test."
However, the court found that no contract existed between EST and
the Warriors to satisfy the second part of the test.' 2 The Warriors had
expressly refused to contract with EST for Johnson's services. The
court held that, absent any contract between EST and the Warriors to
evidence EST's control over the earnings, EST could not be considered
the true earner.' 3 The court held further that Johnson's assignment of
his wages to EST was insufficient to meet the contract criteria of this
test but rather evidenced Johnson's control over his earnings much the
way an "ordinary assignment of wages to a bank" would.' 4
There is strong precedent for determining the true earner in this
kind of situation by looking at the service performer's relationship with
the employing corporation. ' 5 However, there are two important points
to be gleaned from this case. First, the court has articulated, for the
first time, a fairly workable test for determining the actual earner in
this situation. Previously courts have attempted to divine the actual
earner without using a well-defined formula.'6 The Johnson court has
and in consideration of monthly compensation gave the corporation the right to use his
cartoons for syndication purposes. Corporation then entered into a contract to syndicate the
cartoons for compensation significantly greater than was received by cartoonist. Held in-
come from syndication taxable to corporation and not to individual); Laughton v. Commis-
sioner, 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939) (actor Charles Laughton contracted with a corporation for his
services in exchange for a weekly salary for a specified period of time. Laughton was not a
director or officer of the corporation. Corporation contracted with various projects for
Laughton's services. Tax court held income from projects for Laughton's services taxable to
corporation).
11. Johnson, 78 T.C. at 891-92.
12. Id at 893.
13. Id.
14. Id In Johnson v. U.S., 698 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1983) the Court upheld the tax court's
findings that Johnson was liable for the income derived from playing for the Warriors. The
Court also used the tax court's two-part test to determine Johnson was the actual earner.
15. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. at 114; See also Pacella v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 604
(1982) (psychiatrist incorporating practice and signing an employment contract with corpo-
ration held liable for income from patients and services billed by and paid to corporation).
16. In the past, courts have considered different factors dispositive on the question of
who the actual earner was; either the corporation or the individual performing the income
generating service. In Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, the court provided no insight into its
reasoning and simply held Earl liable under the theory that the tax statute required taxing
salaries to the earner. In Fox v. Fontaine, 37 B.T.A. 271, the court was concerned with the
fact that the contract from which income was generated was between the corporation and
the syndication corporation and the cartoonist was not a contracting party. The court in
Laughton v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 101, focused more on the question of whether the
corporation was a separated and distinct entity from Laughton. In Vnuk v. Commissioner,
621 F.2d 1318, the court determined who was to be taxed by looking to see who exercised
ultimate direction and control over the earning of the compensation.
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actually articulated a test that adopts its predecessors' analyses while
stating a standard tax planners can use.
Secondly, in finding Johnson's fatal mistake to be the lack of con-
tract between EST and the Warriors, the Court indicated that a player
in a situation similar to Johnson's could in fact realize the income
deferral goal if he can find a team willing to contract directly with such
a corporation as EST or if he is able to stipulate such as a condition of
the existing contract. In a much broader view, performers, like rock
musicians who realize large salaries for relatively short periods of time
only to sink back into obscurity, may be able to guarantee themselves
reasonable incomes for longer periods of time if they can successfully
become employees of corporations like EST and require that corpora-
tion to negotiate and contract for the performers' services directly with
the record companies and the rock performers.
Grant Marylander

